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Reported since May Ist, 1857.!
CANDLER vs. TILLETT.

22 Beav. 263.

Executor, .Liabilityof-Misapplicationof Assets by Co-executor.
"1If one executor does any act which enables his co-executor to obtain
sole possession of money belonging to the testator's estate, which, but for
that act, he could not have obtained possession of, and this money is afterwards misapplied, the executor who thus enables his co-executor to obtain
possession of the money, is liable to make good the loss."-Per Sir John
Romilly, M.R.
JOHNSON vs. NEWTON.

11 Hare, 160.

Executors-Assets deposited with Bankers-Liability an Bankruptcy of
Bankers.
The testator died in Mlay, 1842, having at that time a balance, rather
less than usual, at his bankers, of £3,243 12s. The executors paid further
sums into the bank to the account of the estate, and also drew out such
sums as they required; so that, on the bankruptcy of the bankers on the
10th of January, 1843, there was in their hands the balance of £2,056 :
17: 11, belonging to the testator's estate, upon which the executors
received dividends to the amount of £1,023 : 8 : 3, which they had duly
accounted for as part of the testator's estate, by which the loss occasioned
by the bankruptcy of the bankers was reduced to £1,033 : 9: 8: It was
found by the Master, "4that there were not any purposes of their trust
which rendered it necessary for the executors to retain the balance, or any
part of it, with the bankers :" it was held, however; by Sir W. Page Wood,
V.C., that the executors were not liable for the loss. "No case," said
his Honor, "4has been cited in the argument, nor do I know of any case,
in which executors, who have merely left moneys belonging to the estate
in the hands of the bankers of the testator, for a period of no more than
nine months after his decease, have been held liable to make good the
fund lost by the failure of the bankers. The executors are no doubt bound
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to exercise their judgment on the safety of the place of deposit, whether it
be that which the testator bad in his lifetime chosen, or whether it be
selected by themselves; and, where a loss unfortunately happens, the
question must always be, how far the executors must be held to be answerable under the circumstances of the case. Now, what are the trusts and
duties of the executors? They have first to pay the debts; secondly, the
legacies; and, thirdly, to hand over the remainder to the residuary legatee.
They are allowed by the rule of law one year before satisfying the claims
of parties under the will. There is no doubt that a case may be suggested,
in which a very large balance of the estate may be in the hands of the
bankers, upon which there is no probability of any further demand arising,
and in which the executors may well be asked why they do not distribute
the estate ...... If the executors in this case, having no directions to
invest the balance of the estate, had thought proper to do so, they would
clearly have been liable to the residuary legatees for any loss on a resale
if the funds had fallen, and the full sum which was invested should have
happened not to be realized. The only course the executors could have
taken, would have been to pay the balance over to the residuary legatees.
There were, it appears, expenses of the executorship to be met, which
afterwards amounted to about £550 j and there were, at the time of the
failure of the bankers, three or four months yet remaining of the time
which the law allows to the executor to wind up the testator's estate.
Executors cannot, in the nature of things, be supposed to be acquainted
with all possible debts of the testator which may appear; and I do not
think that in this case they were bound to have distributed the balance of
the estate, or to have removed it from the bank before the time of the
bankruptcy."
POLLOCK vs. LESTER.

11 Hare, 266.

.lunction-Nuisance-Bric-burning.
In this case an injunction was granted by Sir W. Page Wood, V.0., to
restrain the defendant from burning any bricks on a piece of ground about
sixty yards from the house of the plaintiff, other than those which were
actually burning in clamp, and not to continue such burning beyond a
week from the date of the injunction: the plaintiffs undertaking to proceed
with their action at the then present assizes, and to abide by such order as
the court might make for payment of any damages which should arise to
the defendant in consequence of the order. " Every case of alleged nui-
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sance," said his Honor, "raised a mixed question of law and fact. Every
trade and occupation, called into existence to supply the wants of civilized
life, whether in the construction of dwellings or otherwise, must be lawfully carried on somewhere; and therefore, irrespective of the circumstances by which it was surrounded, it could not be pronounced a nuisance.
The pldintiff, to succeed in a court of law, must prove first damnum and
then i7turia. The observation of Lord Eldon in the case of the Duke of
Grafton vs. Hilliard, (Amb. 160, n. 2, Blunt's Ed.,) would seem to
imply that he thought it doubtful whether brick-burning, even carried on
near dwellings, was legally a nuisance. That it is a nuisance under some
circumstances was established by the decision of the Vice-Chancellor
Knight Bruce in the case of Walter vs. Selfe, (15 Jur. 416;) and in this
case there was positive evidence, on the affidavits, of the injurious effects
which the operation complained of had produced on the state of health of
two of the plaintiffs and members of their families; and the fact might
also be adverted to, that the plaintiffs had been in the complete enjoyment
of these houses, without any brick-burning in the neighborhood, until these
operations had been commenced."

IN RE RICKIT'S TRUST.

11 Hare, 299.

Legac3 ,-Misdescriptionof Legatee-Evidence.
A legacy was given by the testator to his "ni9ece, the daughter of his
late sister Sarah." It appeared that the testatorys -deceased sister's name
was Sarah Ann, and that she -had left only one child, a son named William
Wand, and that he had no niece answering the description contained in
the will. It was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.0., that William Wand
was entitled to the legacy. "The testator," said his Honor, "in ihe will,
alludes to the fact of his sister Sarah being then dead, by referring to her
as his ' late sister Sarah,' and then he intimates that the legacy is intended
for an object who must be living at the date of his will, and must be a
child of a sister who was then dead, and of a sister who bore the name of
Sarah. All these conditions of this description concur in the person of
William Wand; he is also the only child of Sarah, and I do not think that
the fact of his being a male, instead of a female, is of sufficient weight to
exclude him from the benefit of the gift. The case before Lord Langdale,
.yall vs. Hannan, (10 Beav. 536,) is a much stronger case than the
present."
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HANOHETT vs. BRIScOE.

22 Beav. 496.

-Married Woman-Reversionary Interest of, in PersonalProperty,subject
to her own Life Interest to her separate Use-Has no power to Alien.
A married woman being entitled to a fund transferred into the names
of trustees upon trust for her absolutely, and that the dividends should be
held and applied for her separate use for life; it was held by Sir John
Romilly, Ill.R., that she could only dispose of her life interest, and, as her
interest beyond that was reversionary, she could not dispose of it. A
trustee, therefore, who had at her request advanced the whole fund to her
husband, whereby it was lost, was held liable to replace it, indemnifying
himself as far as he was able, out of her life interest. "Here," said his
Honor, "is a fund given to trustees in trust for this lady's separate use.
With respect to that she is a feme sole, she has the power of disposing of
it. Subject to that, it was given to her absolutely. She had then the
simple reversion in the estate. There is no question but that, if that
reversion had been given to her for her separate use, she could have disposed of that reversion. Sturgis vs. Lorp, (13 Yes. 190,) and several
other cases, determine that she could then dispose of the life estate and
the reversion, because she is made a feme sole in respect of both, and has
as such the power of disposing of both ; and although they do not coalesce,
to u-e the expression of the Vice Chancellor of England inthe case referred
to (f,-l vs. Hugonin, 14 Sim. 595,) she had the absolute power of disposal
he lady in this case has the
...
over the whole of the fund........
power of disposition over the one estate during coverture, and she has no
power of disposition over the other until she is discovert, when she acquires
the power of disposing over the other. By what possibility can the fact
of these two estates, or rather two interests, being united in the same
person, give her an interest over the reversion which, taken by itself, she
does not possess? No case was cited to me to remove this difficulty.
Cases are cited which in my opinion go rnudh further, as Whittle vs. ltenning, (11 Beav., 222, 2 Ph. 731,) before Lord Cottenham, where the
interests were of the same quality, but the one had been transferred to the
other for the purpose of making them coalesce. Lord Cottenham said he
would not allow her to dispose of the property. But here they are of
different qualities; the estate for life is for the separate use, but the
reversion is not for the separate use; it is to her absolutely, that is to say,
it is only liable to be disposed of by some instrument when she is.discovert."
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NIcHOLSON vs. TUTIN.

3 K. & J., 159.

Trustees can derive no Profit coniected with Trust- CommissionCollecting Rents.
The decision in this case is an apt illustration of the strictness with
which courts of equity prevent trustees from making a profit in any way
connected with their trust. There, a mortgagee conveyed certain real
estates, subject to incumbrances, the interest of which more than exhausted
the rents, to trustees, upon trust for his creditors. The mortgagees afterwards employed Watson, one of the trustees, as their agent to collect the
rents; it was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.C., that he could not be
allowed any commission out of the rents.
"1 do not think," said his Honor, "that it is competent for a trustee to
accept such a position, and to raise a claim of such an indefinite nature,
unless there had been previously a contract that he should have compensation, or such a case of necessity as would justify such a claim, if made
by a mortgagee in possession. But the persons to determine whether or
not there were such a necessity, or to make such a contract in this case,
would be the trustees themselves, of whom Watson was one. He would
have to decide concerning the commission to be allowed to himself. The
case, therefore, falls within the principle laid down by this court; namely,
that it wid not allow a person to put himselfin apositionwhere his interest
will be inconsistentwith his duty."
SLEIGHT vs. LAWSON. 3 K. & J., 292.
Trustees-Executors-Ruleas to obtaining Inquiry as to TWilful Default.
It was established and acted upon as a general rule by Lord Eldon, that
a plaintiff proceeding against an executor or trustee, in order to obtain an
inquiry as to wilful neglect or default, must aver and prove at feast one
act of wilful neglect or default. In Sleight vs. Lawson, upon the authority
of Coope vs. Carter, (2 De G., Mae., and G., 297, 298,) it was contended
that the rule was to be enlarged; so that, whenever there was an admission
by executors or trustees of certain debts having been due to the testator at
the time of his decease, unless they could prove at the hearing of the cause
that the whole of those debts had been received in the lump, the plaintiff
would be entitled to an inquiry. Sir W. Page Wood, V.0., was of opinion,
"that the rule laid down by Lord Eldon ought to be adhered to; and he
said he was satisfied that Lord Justice Knight Bruce never intended, in
Coojpe vs. Carter, to depart from the rule. That this was the case was
clear from the instance he gave in illustration of his remarks, for he said
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this: I For instance, if the allegation be that a sum of £1,000 has been
lost by wilful default, the inquiry may well be, under what circumstances
it was lost, and into the facts bearing on the loss. Then the evidence will
be supplied ; and, when it comes back to the court, au inquiry as to wilful
default may be directed.' In other words," added his Honor, "you may
raise your contest upon any item or items you choose to fix upon, as a
specific instance of wilful neglect or default. And if you make out a case
of suspicion in the mind of the court-if it remains doubtful whether
wilful neglect and default have not been committed-then you may have
the inquiry in question. But it is clear it was never intended to alter the
law on this subject as laid down by Lord Eldon."
DrPPLE vs. CORLES.

11 Hare,

183.

oluntary Trust-Mere Declarationof Intention to divide Property does
not amount to Declarationof Trust.
The eldest son of a testator, on the day of the funeral, communicated to
the family his determination to divide the estate (the whole of which he
took by the will) equally between' himself and his brothers and sisters;
adding, that he proposed to sell every thing in order that it might not be
said that he had taken more than any of the others. He afterwards sold
some personal chattels, and became himself the purchaser of the house in
which the testator lived, at a sum fixed or assented to by the rest of the
family-the husband of a married sister having signed a document expressing such assent on her behalf.
It was held by Sir W. Page Wood, V.0., that with respect to the property remaining undivided, the eldest son had not declared a complete
trust in favor of his brothers and sisters; but that his expression of an
intention to divide it amounted to a mere nudum pactum, which would
not be enforced in equity. "I agree," said his Honor, "that it is not
necessary that the precise words 'trust' or ' confidence' should be used, in
order to create a trust, and that any expressions will suffice from which it
is clear that the party using them considers himself a trustee, and adopts
that character. With regard to personal estate, it is not even necessary
that the intention should be expressed in writing, but a trust may be
created by parol. If, however, the case be one of doubt or difficulty upon
the words which have been supposed to have been used, the court will give
weight to the consideration, that the words, not being committed to writing
in any definite and unquestionable form, may not be the deliberately
expressed sentiments of the party. Lord Eldon, in ex parte Pye, adverts
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especially to the fact, that the testator had in that case 'committed to
writing' what he thought a sufficient declaration, that he held that part of
No authority has been
the estate in trust for the annuitant. . .
cited, nor do I think can be found, that upon expressions not importing a
determination to hold property upon trust for others, but importing nothing
more than a determination to divide it amongst such other persons, it can
be held that such expressions constitute a trust, as distinguished from a
mere promise to give." After considering whether there was a declaration
of trust, or a mere promise to give, his Honor added, "The utmost that
can be urged in behalf of the plaintiff is, that the declaration of the defendant in this case is eguivocal; but that is not sufficient to establish the title
which he claims. I think, however, that the evidence of what took place
preponderates in favor of there being nothing more than a promise to give,
and not any trust declared."

MORLAND VS. RICnARmSON.

22 Beav., 596.

ILjvnction-Disturbanceof Graes purchased in Ferpetuity.
Some persons had purchased graves from the trustees of a burial-ground
in perpetuity, but no grant was ever executed to them, and the sole evidence of their title was a receipt for the purchase-money, stating the nature
of the sale. The burial-ground was afterwards closed by an order of the
Queen in Council; but it seems that, under the 6th sec. of 15 and 16 Vict.
c. 55, the Secretary of State for the Home Department is empowered, in
cases of private right, to permit burials in family vaults, notwithstanding
the ground has been discontinued to be used for burial purposes generally.
It was held by Sir John Romilly, M.R., that the plaintiffs were entitled
to an injunction to restrain the trustees from injuring, defacing, and obliterating the graves of the plaintiffs in the burial-ground, or any of them,
and from removing any of the gravestones. "This order," said his Honor,
" will not however, in the slightest degree, prevent the defendants from
making such use of the rest of the burial-ground as they may be advised
to be fit and proper, with regard to the existing circumstances of the case.
The rights of the plaintiffs do not extend to, or in my opinion affect, this
part of the ground; they have nothing to do therewith. It is admitted
that they have no legal right, and their equitable rights being confined to
a right of burial in a particular spot, whenever the Secretary of State for
the Home Department shall think fit to give such leave."

